Dr Yu Jie is senior research fellow on China at Chatham House, focusing on the decision-making process of Chinese foreign policy as well as China’s economic diplomacy. She frequently comments in major media outlets such as BBC News and the Financial Times; and regularly briefs senior policy practitioners from the G7 member governments, the Silk Road Fund in Beijing. She also frequently advises major FTSE 100 corporates and leading European financial institutions on China’s political landscape. Yu Jie has testified on China’s foreign affairs at various UK Parliament committees and was previously head of China Foresight at LSE IDEAS. Prior to LSE, she was a management consultant, specializing in Chinese state-owned enterprises investments in Europe and Chinese market entry strategies for European conglomerates at the London Office of Roland Berger. The London School of Economics and Political Science recognized her as one of its ‘Leading Women’ in 2018 for her contribution in teaching and engaging the public debates on China’s foreign affairs. She is a “Young Leader” for the Shangri-La Dialogue.

KEY TAKE-AWAY

  • Good news is scarce – the situation it ‘pretty bad’ with a convergence of circumstances making constructive bilateral relations almost impossible. Domestic politics both in US and China have moved in an extreme direction. In US, the bi-partisan hawkish stance has silenced the voice of the ‘engagement community’ seeking discussion and conciliation. The latter has been further undermined by the absence of any key ‘contact people’ on either side – the post-Covid hope of a renewal of discussions hasn’t happened.  (No Chinese ambassador in Washington for the last 5 months). Plus, an echo-chamber political ecology in both Beijing and Washington is giving rise to foreign policy decisions forged on false opinions.

  • This hardening political stance occurs in conjunction with a further layer of increasing rivalry (already underway ten years ago) relating to trade and technology. The US cannot countenance that China might not only complete the catch-up process but go beyond and cement its position as the global champion of technology.

  • There has been a shift of mindset in Beijing: economic development is no longer the only benchmark; national security is now also firmly on the agenda.  Having said that the creation of employment remains vital and FDI can play a crucial role. In the medium-term China is still investible.

  • The tension between these two objectives is nowhere more apparent than in Xi’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. It is indeed a precarious balancing act. There is much at stake for Xi and it’s not only about China and Russia, but also China and Ukraine,and China and its key audience in the Global South. Chinese relations with Ukraine have been historically good, Ukraine potentially key to the success of China’s Belt and Road initiative.  The Chinese official policy vis-à-vis the red lines relating to territorial integrity in any peace plan has oscillated but since a recent call between Presidents Zelensky and Xi it has been re-established as a sine qua non. There are important parallels to be drawn with China’s own attitude towards Taiwan. Xi wants a peace plan to re-set his diplomatic relations with the West; but from both a domestic point of view and in terms of other foreign alignments, he cannot be seen to be buying into NATO arguments and cannot let Russia lose too badly.

  • Regarding Taiwan, from China’s standpoint there is no specific timeline – events risk being driven by US actions and reactions. For the time being, the current status quo is serving both Beijing and Taipei. For China, a peaceful re-unification remains the objective (but the example of Hong Kong undermines the credibility of the one country, two systems option). In terms of the potential for military escalation, it will never be far from Xi’s mind that most of China’s middle-class has one child to ‘sacrifice’ to any military undertaking in pursuit of Taiwan.